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OF NEVADA DOES NOT APPLY LEX LOCI DELICTI RULE
ARGUMENT
POINT I

APPLICATION OF THE CHOICE OF LAW RULE OF LEX LOCI
DELICTI IS INAPPROPRIATE IN WORKMENS COMPENSATION CASES
One major issue in this case which both Defendants have failed
to recognize and address is that the doctrine of Lex Loci Delicti
is applied to determine which state's tort law should be applied,
not which state's workers' compensation laws apply,

A workers'

compensation case such as the one now before this Court, presents
an entirely different set of problems than does a traditional tort
case where a resident

of one

state

is injured

in another.

Consequently, such a case also presents different choice of law
problems.

The Defendants are asking this Court to apply a tort

choice

law doctrine

of

compensation

to determine

laws applies.

which

state's workers'

Their logic is that if Nevada's

workers' compensation laws are applied, then those statutes will
bar any right by this Plaintiff to pursue a third party action.
As stated by the Connecticut Supreme Court in Simaitis v.
Flood, 437 A.2d 828, 831 (Conn. 1980), "the place-of-injury rule
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affords

only

an

unsatisfactory

resolution

to

the

workers'

compensation choice of laws problem."
The choice of law in workers' compensation cases is the law of
the state which paid the workers' compensation benefits and where
the employment relationship commenced.

Id. at 833.

Defendant, Steel Deck, claims that Lex Loci Delicti needs to
be applied, otherwise chaos will ensue with different outcomes in
different

states.

Defendants

fail

to

recognize

that

the

application of Lex Loci Delicti will provide uncertainty and
different results in any event.

Under their theory, a Nevada

resident, hired in Nevada by a Nevada employer who is injured in
Utah would be allowed to seek recovery for his damages applying
Utah's workers' compensation laws. A different result than the one
they would like to have this Court impose on the Plaintiff and
other Utah residents in his position who are injured in another
state

while

temporarily

working

there

for

a Utah employer.

Defendant, Steel Deck, claims that Lex Loci Delicti promotes
stability in the law, predictability of results, justice among the
parties and prevents the scourge of forum shopping.
The application of the workers' compensation choice of law
rule advocated by this Plaintiff would provide the same "stability"
which Steel Deck feels needs to be safeguarded.
The application of the workers' compensation laws of the state
where the injured party was hired and where he receives his
workers' compensation benefits provides a uniform application of
the law.

Granted, if an injured party is from a state which bars

1
third party actions and he is injured in another state which may
grant such a right to its residents, he will be barred from
pursuing his lawsuit.

Such a result is no less predictable than

the application of Lex Loci Delicti.
The rule advocated by the Plaintiff provides uniformity of
justice among the parties and likewise prevents "the scourge of
forum shopping" since the law to be applied, no matter where the
action is initiated, is that of the state where the injured party
is employed and received workersf compensation benefits.
In its brief, Steel Deck poses the question: "which law would
apply if the injured party seeking to maintain a negligence action
were not a resident of Utah?" (Steel Deck's Brief at 12). Although
this issue is not now before this Court on appeal, the answer is
quite simple. The workers' compensation law of the state where he
or she was employed and received workers' compensation benefits
would apply in determining whether he has the right to bring such
an action.
If others were injured on the Nevada Project as a result of a
third party's negligence, the right to pursue that action against
that third-party will be determined by the workers' compensation
laws of their state of employment and where they received their
workers' compensation benefits.

Under this scenario, if, for

example, a California resident was injured on the Project due to
Steel Deck's or Layton's negligence, he or she could commence an
action in Utah or California, but the trial court should apply
California's workers' compensation laws, which, by the way, allows
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third-party actions as does Utah's.
The residents of the individual states should be able to rely
on their home state's labor and industrial laws as they move across
state lines for temporary work.

Obviously, someone in this

Plaintiff's position who was hired in Utah by a Utah employer
should have a reasonable expectation that if he is injured while
temporarily working in another state, that the employment and labor
laws of the state of Utah, including the workers' compensation
laws, would provide him with all of the relief afforded by that
statute. This includes the right under Utah Code Annotated §35-162, 1953 as amended, to bring a negligence action against any third
party who may have contributed to or caused the injuries to the
injured worker.
POINT II
LEGISLATURE INTENDED THAT UTAH'S WORKERS'
COMPENSATION ACT HAVE EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT
WHERE A UTAH WORKER IS INJURED IN ANOTHER STATE
The main thrust of Plaintiff's argument is that in a workers'
compensation conflict issue, the workers' compensation laws of the
state where the injured worker was hired and received workers'
compensation benefits should be applied in determining whether a
third party action may be brought.

Dueitt v. Williams, 764 F.2d

1180 (5th Cir. 1985), O'Connor v. Lee-Hv Paving Corp. , 579 F.2d 194
(2nd Cir. 1978), certiorari denied, Gillespie v. Schwartz, 493 U.S.
1034, 99 S.Ct. 638, 58 L.Ed.2d 696, Gregory v. Garrett Corp., 578
F.Supp. 871 (D.C.N.Y. 1983), Fox v. Sharlow, 579 A.2d 603 (Conn.
Suppr. 1990), Fagan v. John J. Casale, Inc., 16 Misc.2d 1046, 184
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N.Y.S.2d 109 (1959) .
Plaintiff

was

hired

in

Utah,

his

employer

corporation and he sought and received workersf
benefits in Utah.

is

a

Utah

compensation

If this Court adopts this rule, then it is

apparent as pointed out in Plaintiff's initial brief that he has a
right under Utah Code Annotated §35-1-62 to seek recovery for his
injuries from negligent third parties, including the appellees
herein.
In his initial brief, Plaintiff argued that Utah's Workers1
Compensation Act has extraterritorial effect and grants the right
to bring a third party action even when the injuries occur outside
of this state.

In its brief, Defendants Steel Deck assails

Plaintiff! s argument with the absurd statement that Plaintiff cited
"dubious" cases to support his position (Steel Deck's Brief at 14).
Plaintiff finds it curious that Defendant Steel Deck would
characterize decisions of this and other courts on this issue as
having dubious merit while at the same time failing to cite any
cases whatsoever which support its position to the contrary.
Instead, Defendant Steel Deck embarks on its own interpretation of
Utahf s workers' compensation statutes without providing any case
law which supports that interpretation. Accordingly, Steel Deck's
unsupported argument on this position should stand on its own.

Defendant Layton makes the allegation that:
Although probably irrelevant, Plaintiff has
gone so far as to misstate in his Statement of
Facts that he filed this action for negligence
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code

2
Annotated §35-1-62 . . .to recover damages
from negligent third parties including the
defendants. (Layton's Brief at 9).
Layton was correct by stating that this issue is irrelevant.
It is not an issue on appeal and Plaintiff's action is not
defective

simply

Complaint.

because

the

statute was

not

cited

in his

Furthermore, the trial court's Findings of Fact on

Layton's own Motion to Dismiss states:

"1.

This is an action

brought pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §35-1-62, 1953 as amended."
(R. 321-329).

Layton was given ample opportunity to object to the

trial court's findings but failed to do so and it is absolutely
inappropriate to now raise this issue on appeal.
Furthermore, Layton mischaracterizes

Plaintiff's position

regarding the application of §35-1-54 to this case. Plaintiff does
not contend that §35-1-54 is a statutory exception to Lex Loci
Delicti. Rather, Plaintiff's argument is that Lex Loci Delicti is
not

applicable

authorities,

and

support

that
the

§35-1-54, together
proposition

that

with
Utah's

the

cited

Workmen's

Compensation Act has extraterritorial effect and provides all
benefits under the Act to Utah workers who are injured while
temporarily working in another state.

This includes the right

under §35-1-62 to bring a third party action such as the one now
before this Court.
POINT III
APPLICATION OF "MOST SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS" AND/OR
"INTEREST ANALYSIS" APPROACH IS INAPPROPRIATE IN
WORKERS' COMPENSATION CASES
In their briefs, Defendants incorrectly
characterize

8
Plaintiff's position as being one which advocates a combination of
the "most significant contacts" and "interest analysis" tests
applied in tort choice of law cases which have rejected the
traditional Lex Loci Delicti doctrine.
Plaintiff

is

advocating

the

rule

established

by

the

authorities cited herein and in his initial brief that simply
states that the workers' compensation law of the state where the
injured

party was hired

and where he received

his workers'

compensation benefits should be applied in determining whether he
can proceed with a third party negligence suit.
significant contacts" and

The

"most

"interest analysis" approaches deal

strictly with common law tort actions and not workersf compensation
cases.
Restatement "Second" Conflicts of Law §145 provides:
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties
with respect to an issue in tort are
determined by the local law of the state
which, as to that issue, has the most
significant relationship to the occurrence and
the parties under the principals stated in §6.
(emphasis added)
The issue now before this Court is not one of tort law, but
one of workers1 compensation law.

As stated in Hauch v. Connor,

453 A.2d 1207, 1211 (Md. 1983):
{M}any
courts
recognize
that workman's
compensation law conflict issues present
distinct policy questions and should not be
treated as tort or contract matters for choice
of law purposes. We agree with this approach,
(emphasis added)
Accordingly, the tort choice of law approaches addressed by
Defendants should not be considered in the context of this, a

£
workers' compensation case, since there are several policy reasons
which weigh against such an approach. Those policy considerations
were addressed

in this Plaintiff's

initial Brief.

However,

Plaintiff, for the purpose of clarifying this issue, would like to
reiterate that those policy reasons include:
1.

Utah has an interest in protecting the rights of its

residents who are hired in Utah by Utah employers.
2.

Utah has a right to regulate and oversee contracts of

employment which are executed in this state.
3.

Utah has the right to protect the reasonable expectation

of individuals hired in this state that they will be covered by and
afforded the protection of Utah's workers' compensation laws,
including the right under §35-1-62 to pursue legal action for the
recovery of damages due to the negligence of a third party.
Assuming, for the purposes of argument, that the "most
significant contacts" or "interest analysis" approaches are applied
in this case, Plaintiff contends that the factors which are weighed
would heavily favor the state of Utah and the application of its
workers' compensation law.

Under the "most significant contacts"

analysis, Plaintiff concedes that the place of the injury and the
place where the conduct causing the injury occurred are in Nevada.
However, with respect to the second two factors, it is clear from
the record that the domicile, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business of the parties; and the place
where the relationship between the parties is centered is clearly
within the state of Utah.

It is undisputed that the Plaintiff, at
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the time of his injury was a resident of the state of Utah, his
employer, Harv & Higham Masonry together with the two Defendants
herein were Utah corporations with their principal places of
business

being

in

Salt

Lake

City, Utah.

Furthermore, the

relationship between all of the parties was clearly centered in
Salt Lake City which was the location where the subcontracts
between Layton, Steel Deck and Harv & Higham Masonry were executed.
The Plaintiff was hired by his employer, Harv & Higham Masonry, in
the state of Utah.
Under the "most significant contacts" analysis, there are two
factors which favor the state of Nevada and two factors which favor
the state of Utah.

Under this analysis, the Court is then faced

with the dilemma of which factor should be afforded the most weight
and

consideration

in

determining

which

statef s

workersf

compensation law should be applied. "The mere counting of contacts
should not be determinative of the law to be applied, but it is
rather the relevancy of the contact in the terms of policy
considerations important to the forum, vis-a-vis, other contact
states."

15A C.J.S. Conflict of Laws §8(4), citing Wilcox v.

Wilcox, 133 N.W.2d 408.

Plaintiff has previously addressed and

pointed out the policy considerations which he feels give the state
of Utah a greater interest in the application of its workersf
compensation laws. As stated in Wilson v. Faull, 141 A. 2d 768, 774
(N.J. 1958), the forum state in a workers1 compensation case has a
sufficient interest in the work injury to justify the application
of its own law.

Further, the Court in Wilson held that the fact
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that an employment contract is made within a state is deemed a
sufficient interest to satisfy the full faith and credit clause of
the United States Constitution.

Id. at 775.

Once again, Plaintiff submits that while although the injury
and the conduct giving rise to the injury occurred in Nevada, there
are several other factors in this particular case which need to be
seriously considered by this Court in determining that Utah has
sufficient

interests and

contacts to apply its own workers1

compensation law.
Defendant, Steel Deck, in its brief, seems to be making the
argument that it would unreasonable for other subcontractors such
as Bilt-Rite and I. Christensen to expect to be brought before a
Utah court in a personal injury case where an allegation of
negligence on their part is made.
facts

of

this

case

which

One only need to examine the

clearly

demonstrate

that

these

subcontractors executed a subcontract in Salt Lake City, Utah with
Layton Construction Company, Inc. which is a Utah corporation. It
is reasonably foreseeable that whenever a party executes such a
contract in the state of Utah, he or it may be brought before the
courts of this state to answer for its conduct or misconduct during
the

performance

of

its

obligations

under

that

contract.

Defendants, time and time again make the inference that the state
of Nevada is a potential Defendant in this case.
that

this

is a ludicrous argument

Plaintiff feels

since there has been no

indication whatsoever that the state of Nevada was negligent in any
way in contributing to Plaintiff's injuries. Notwithstanding this
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argument, the state of Nevada, likewise, hired as its general
contractor, a Utah corporation and it would not be unreasonable to
expect the state of Nevada to have to answer for its performance
under

the

terms

of

the

contract.

However,

the

issue

of

jurisdiction over a dispute between two states is not now before
this

Court and is not now subject to review.
Defendant, Steel Deck, also argues that Nevada's relation to

the parties is equal to or greater than Utahfs relation.
again, Plaintiff

contends that this argument

foundation whatsoever.

Once

is without any

The Appellees in this case are both Utah

corporations, hired Utah residents as employees, and executed and
entered into employment contracts and subcontracts in the state of
Utah.

Obviously, the state of Utah has a very close relationship

to the parties herein and has a legitimate interest in overseeing
those relationships, especially where a Utah resident is injured
while performing his services under the terms of a contract of
employment which was entered into in this state and where the
injured party received workers1 compensation benefits under Utah
law and

subject to the jurisdiction

of

the Utah

Industrial

Commission.
POINT IV
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED S35-1-62 CONTEMPLATES
AND PROVIDES REMEDY FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY
NEGLIGENT THIRD PARTIES WHO DO NOT PROVIDE
WORKERS1 COMPENSATION INSURANCE
In its brief, Defendant, Steel Deck, makes the argument that
this Plaintiff's workers1 compensation benefits are adequate and
sufficient to meet his needs.

It states that an injured employee

II
cannot choose to seek more money by initiating lawsuits.
Deck's Brief at 22).

(Steel

Such an argument clearly runs contrary to the

intention of the Utah Legislature to provide various remedies to
workers who are injured while working within the course and scope
of their employment.

Under the Act, the Plaintiff's employer's

obligation has been met due to the fact that it has fulfilled its
legal

requirement

of

compensation insurance.

providing

the

Plaintiff

with workers'

The Plaintiff has been compensated under

the policy of insurance and the employer's obligation thereunder
has been discharged.
However, pursuant

to Utah

Code Annotated

§35-1-62, the

Plaintiff is afforded the right to pursue a third party action
against negligent tortfeasors who contributed to or caused his
injuries

and

insurance.

who

did

not provide

his workers' compensation

Pate v. Marathon Steel Company, 777 P. 2d 428 (Utah

1989), and Bosch v. Busch Development, Inc., 777 P.2d 431 (Utah,
1989).
Defendant, Steel

Deck, seems

to

be

arguing

that

since

Plaintiff has recovered benefits from the workers' compensation
insurance carrier, all of this state's interests in the case are
satisfied and that his statutory right to pursue a negligence
action and this state's interest in providing and preserving that
right are somehow unimportant.

To deprive the Plaintiff of this

right would have a significant impact on the Plaintiff and others
in his position.

Plaintiff's recovery of workers' compensation

benefits is really insignificant in comparison with the substantial

11
damages which he has sustained.

Granted, the Plaintiff will be

provided with medical coverage for his injuries for the duration of
his life. However, the other elements of damages involved in this
case have not been clearly disposed of or taken care of by his
recovery of workers1 compensation benefits.

It is obvious that

these factors were taken into consideration by the Utah Legislature
when it enacted §35-1-62 in allowing an injured worker to seek the
recovery of additional damages from negligent third parties instead
of enacting a statute similar to that of Nevada which bars any such
claims and provides that workers' compensation is the sole and
exclusive remedy. Obviously, the Utah Legislature felt that it was
important to provide this remedy in an effort to provide an optimum
recovery for injured workers v/ho are hired in this state.
For the various policy reasons discussed in this Plaintiff's
initial brief and those reasons stated herein, it is clear and
obvious that the stace of Utah has greater interests in applying
its own workers1 compensation laws and that the contacts with the
state of Utah

are significant

enough

to apply

its workers1

compensation law should this Court adopt this analysis.

However,

Plaintiff would like to reiterate his position and argument that
the appropriate rule to be applied in this and other cases of its
kind is the law of the state where the injured employee was hired
and

which

benefits.

paid

the

injured

employeers

workers1

compensation

As in this case, if those workers1 compensation laws

provide a remedy to pursue a third party negligence claim, then
that right should be granted to the employee who has received

15
benefits under those laws.
POINT V
IN WORKERS1 COMPENSATION CONFLICT CASES, STATE
OF NEVADA DOES NOT APPLY LEX LOCI DELICTI RULE
WHICH IS ADVOCATED BY DEFENDANTS
In its brief, Layton cites the case of Tab Construction Co. v.
Eighth Judicial District Court, 83 Nev. 364, 432 P.2d 90 (1967) in
support of its position that Nevada's interests in this case are
somehow more compelling than those of Utah.

It is interesting to

note that in Tab, the Nevada Supreme Court, in discussing a
workers' compensation conflict issue makes no mention of the Lex
Loci Delicti rule which is advocated by the Defendants herein and
cites various issues which need to be considered by the trial court
in determining which state's workers' compensation law should be
applied.

In its brief, Layton has failed to list all of the

factors listed by the Nevada Supreme Court. Those factors in their
entirety which are cited by the Court included:

Nevada was the

forum state, the general contractor was a Nevada resident, Nevada
was the place of the injury, the place where the employment
relationship existed, the place where the general contractor's
business was localized, and the place where the employees worked.
Id. at 91.
If Layton wishes to rely on Tab in support of its argument,
then it is clear that Utah's "interests" and "contacts" in this
case are more substantial than Nevada's. Granted, Nevada was where
Mr. Shaw was working when he was injured.

However, Utah is the

forum state, Layton, which is the general contractor, is a Utah
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resident and its business is localized in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Furthermore, the place of Plaintiff's employment was Utah. He was
hired by Harv & Higham Masonry which is a Utah corporation and he
performed several jobs for his employer in Utah prior to working on
the Nevada project.

Of further significance, and as has been

stated earlier, the subcontracts between Layton and Plaintiff's
employer and Defendant Steel Deck were executed in Salt Lake City,
Utah.
Layton concedes that it is not a Nevada resident but argues
that the fact that the state of Nevada is owner of the Project
should somehow make a difference. The Nevada Supreme Court in Tab
did not list the ownership of a project as a determining factor.
Furthermore, the state of Nevada is not a party to the action and
Plaintiff has no intention of naming it as a party.
Layton argues that since Plaintiff "chose" to work for his
employer in Nevada and joined a union there, then he has availed
himself of Nevada's "benefits". The state of Nevada has bestowed
no benefits whatsoever on the Plaintiff. The only reason Plaintiff
was paid more was due to the fact that he received a per diem
living allowance while he was temporarily living in Nevada while he
worked on the Project.

This is a common benefit provided to

construction workers who are temporarily assigned to jobs away from
their place of residence and was a benefit given to Mr. Shaw by his
Utah employer, and was not a benefit which came from the State of
Nevada.
Plaintiff did not receive any benefits, including workers'
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compensation benefits from Nevada. And now, Defendants are arguing
that Nevada's workers1 compensation laws should be applied in
depriving Plaintiff of his right to recover for his injuries caused
by negligent tortfeasors.

Such a negative and oppressive outcome

for the Plaintiff is anything but a benefit.
One final distinction in the Tab case which needs to be
pointed out, is the fact that in Tab the lawsuit was filed in
Nevada against the general contractor which was a Nevada resident.
As stated by the Nevada Supreme Court in Tab:
Significant is the fact that it is the state
of the forum.
If the forum state is
concerned, it will not favor the application
of a rule repugnant to its own policies, and
the law of the forum will presumptively applyF
unless it becomes clear that non-forum
incidents are of greater significance. Id. at
91.
Utah, as the forum state, has established, as its policy, the
right of injured workers to seek recovery from negligent third
parties pursuant to §35-1-62. The application of Nevada's workers1
compensation laws, which prohibits such actions is so clearly
repugnant to that policy, that no elaboration is needed.
The factors which favor the application of Utah's workers'
compensation

laws

have

been dealt

with

in great

detail

in

Plaintiff's initial brief as well as this Reply Brief. Taking into
consideration all of the factors which the Nevada Supreme Court
deems to be important and of significance, it is clear that the
workers' compensation laws of Utah would be applied, especially in
light of the importance which the state of Nevada places on the
interests of the forum state and not necessarily those interests of
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the state where the injury occurred.
CONCLUSION
As set forth in Plaintiff's initial brief and as set forth
hereinabove, the prevailing authority states that the application
of the rule of Lex Loci Delicti in workers1 compensation case, is
inappropriate due to various policy reasons.

The current trend

throughout the country applies a different choice of law standard
in cases of this type wherein the law of the state where the
injured party resides, where he was employed, and where he received
his workersf compensation benefits is applied in determining his
right to bring a third party action, not the workers1 compensation
laws of the state where he was injured.
The application of the rule advocated by this Plaintiff
affords the same, and in some cases better, stability in the
application of law and prevents the "scourge of forum shopping"
which seems to be of concern to the Defendants herein.
Furthermore, Utah's Workmen's Compensation Act was and is
intended by the Legislature and, according to decisions of this
Court, to have extraterritorial effect and the benefits provided by
the Act, including the right to bring a third party tort action,
are conferred upon Utah residents who are injured while temporarily
working in another state for a Utah employer.
The prevailing rule being adopted by numerous jurisdictions is
not the "most significant contacts" or the "interest analysis"
approaches which are advocated by the Defendants.

However, even

under these theories, it is clear that Utahfs interests and
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contacts with the parties and the events are so significant that
there is no reason why Utah's workers1 compensation laws should not
be applied. Furthermore, as enunciated by the Nevada Supreme Court
in the Tab Construction case, the fact that Utah is the forum state
together with the other elements involving the residence of the
Plaintiff

and

the

Defendants

in

Utah

is

of

such

profound

significance that Utah's laws should be applied.
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully reguests that
the Orders of the Trial Court granting Summary Judgment and
Dismissal be reversed and that this matter be remanded to the Trial
Court for further proceedings.
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